Ahrtract-We propose a cooperation and accounting scheme for multi-hop cellular networks, which stimulates cooperation among nodes by making it a rewarding alternative to selfishness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-hop cellular networks (also called hybrid networks) increasingly attract interest in the research conununity. They appear to be a promising combination of the advantages of two worlds: the dynamics of mobile ad hoc networks and the reliability of cellular networks. The motivation to overcome the single-hop limit between mobile and access point in (infrastructured) wireless networks and use multiple hops instead, comes from the gained ability to dynamically adapt the network topology to the respective needs. A better and larger coverage area and reduced installation costs are advantages for a wireless network provider in that case. Nodes can reduce their energy consumption for transmitting packets due to shorter next-hop distances. In the context of hybrid net works new possibilities to deal with the weaknesses of mobile ad hoc networks become available. We think that besides the security and routing issues the cooperation among nodes is of great importance. We propose a cooperation and accounting scheme for hybrid networks called CASHnet, which takes into account the availability of a reliable network infrastructure and stimulates cooperation by making it a rewarding alternative to selfishness.
The application scenarios of mobile ad hoc networks have become broader over time. Starting with nodes acting on behalf of a single authority in emergency situations, today we see civilian (and conunercial) scenarios where each node is its own authority. When we attribute individuality to each node of a mobile ad hoc network, we have to deal with a node's individualism, especially in the form of selfishness. A node expresses its selfishness in the refusal of cooperation, i.e.
an individual node might refuse forwarding packets from other nodes in order to save energy for transmitting its own packets. This behavior leads of course to a malfunctioning mobile ad hoc network.
II. RELATED WORK
The first generation of proposed cooperation schemes for mobile ad hoc networks apply rather restrictive control mech anisms. Besides technical issues, restriction neglects the node's freedom of decision (to participate or to not participate) to a certain extent. In civilian scenarios it seems more suitable to achieve cooperation among nodes by means of rewards instead of penalization. Moreover, by using the available infrastructure in a multi-hop cellular network, it becomes possible to offer an architecture which corresponds with this notion. So far most of the cooperation schemes target mobile ad hoc networks only. Recently, few approaches have been taken to address the problem of cooperation among nodes in the context of multi hop cellular networks.
Several proposals have been made to stimulate cooperation among nodes, The first approaches were aimed at mobile ad hoc networks and enforced cooperation by threat of punish ment. In the Nuglet [1] scheme a node can only transmit self-generated packets when it has forwarded enough packets from its neighbors before. In the CONFIDANT [2] approach the behavior of a node is monitored by its neighbors and a selfish node will be isolated from the network. In both concepts a node can be excluded from participating in the network without itself being at fault (starvation or collective false accusation).
With the Sprite [3] scheme rewards have been introduced as incentive for cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks. Nodes report their forwarding activities to a central authority reach able via an overlay network. In conjunction with the missing security mechanisms this scheme seems highly vulnerable to attacks and transmission errors. In [4] the authors suggest the usage of rewards in multi-hop cellular networks and let a central authority collect and analyze reports to decide about rewards and punishments. However, the authors assume a single-hop down-link (from the base station to the node), which might not be available easily.
The authors of [5] and [6] propose similar charging schemes, where cooperative nodes get rewarded in a multihop cellular network environment. They both heavily rely on centralized accounting and security mechanisms. To remuner ate intennediate forwarding nodes, both schemes require the complete route infonnation from the sender to the receiver (e.g. using source routing). However, source routing does not scale well under high node mobility. Also, both schemes do not support cost sharing between sender and receiver, when both of them reside in different ad hoc networks. The sender also has to pay for the distance from the gateway to the destination. To better cope with misuse the authors of [5] require all the network traffic to go via the operator's access points, which leads to inefficient routes for traffic within the same ad hoc network. [6] requires an existing AAA infrastructure, which might not be available for all multi-hop cellular network scenarios. In a recent proposal [7] , the authors extended their work from [5] . They introduced a local Nuglet counter for each node to address the issues of inefficient routes in pure mobile ad hoc networks and a central auditing entity [4] to better cope with abuse. The weaknesses of the Nuglet scheme, such as the unresolvable starvation of selfish nodes due to a single counter and the unsuitability for civilian (commercial) applications because of neglecting the node's freedom of . choice (to cooperate or to not cooperate) remain as well as the single-hop down-link. With our scheme we provide decentralized accounting and security mechanisms to the largest extent possible in a multi hop cellular network environment. We support initiator-and receiver-based payments and we do not require full route infonnation from the sender to the receiver. Also, our approach coexists with ad hoc only traffic in the sense that nodes get neither charged nor remunerated for this kind of traffic. We think that ad hoc only communication should be free since the provider has no cost in terms of network traffi c. Although he provides the security mechanisms via the smart cards, ad hoc only communication would still be possible without him. The charge for the security service could be based on a subscription fee. Because we target multi-hop cellular networks in civilian use, where each node can be seen as its own authority, we leave the choice of cooperation to the node. But by providing monetary rewards we make cooperation among nodes a gainful alternative to selfishness.
III. CASH NET ARCHITECTURE AND OPERATION
In our scheme we assume -similar to the Nuglet [1]
approach -the existence of a tamper resistant device, such as a smart card in each node. This device ensures a protected environment, where the functions of our schemes can be executed safely. Also, we assume the availability of a routing algorithm, which provides the hop count to the base station (e.g. AODV or DSR). Additionally, we require sufficient processing power and memory on the node. For our scheme we define an architecture as displayed in Fig. 1 .
The CASHnet charging and rewarding mechanism works as follows: Every time a node wants to transmit a self generated packet (i.e. node 0), it has to pay with Trafflc Credits. Every time a node forwards a packet (i.e. nodes NAI Our security mechanisms are based on public key cryptog raphy. Nodes authenticate themselves using certificates issued by the provider. To avoid the creation of bogus nodes, we give a short lifetime to the certificates forcing the node owner to regularly visit a provider's service station. Transmitted messages are digitally signed to provide non-repudiation (data integrity and data origin authentication).
The operation of CASHnet is described in the following paragraphs. Fig. 1 shows an example scenario to which all the defined steps can be applied. The following notation is used: each paragraph describes a coherent phase of the operation process. A phase consists of several enumerated actions, which are executed consecutively. The processing of a phase can be terminated by a reference to another phase "==>" or by a termination command "0". Numbered list entries in the fonn of questions indicated a forking of the processing path. After the successful validation of an AUTH Request message, the destination sends back an AUTH Reply message to the originating node O. When node 0 receives the AUTH reply message, it knows that a path with cooperative node exists and can start with the transmission of self-generated data packets.
Also, every intermediate node N participating in the com munication needs to authenticate itself to the previous and the next node along the path. To reduce the delay caused by unauthenticated nodes on a forwarding path, each node in the hybrid network authenticates itself to all its one-hop neighbors. The identity and public key pairs of successfully authenticated neighboring nodes are also stored in the AUTH list.
If a route changes and a new node joins the path, it is already authenticated to its one-hop neighbors due to the periodic neighboring authentication, yet the new node has to authenticate the originator of the packet, which might cause a small delay. 
IV. LIVELINESS EVALUATION
In our first simulation runs of the CASHnet protocol we investigated the issue of starving nodes. In particular, we are interested in the case when a node is unable to transmit self generated packets because it has not enough Traffic Credits (i.e. it has run out of Traffic Credits or the hop distance of the destination is to high).
A. Implementation Details
For the simulation we use ns-2 [8], where we implemented a simplified version of the CASHnet scheme including the .. . Fig. 2 Fig. 2 shows our simulation scenarios. We only consider one multi-hop cellular network in this simulation runs. The simulation area is 1500 x 800 meters. A gateway is placed at the border of the sector. 40 nodes are placed randomly inside the area and every node is communicating to the gateway. In the current simulation setup the movements of the nodes are pre-calculated using the random waypoint model with a minimum speed of 1 mls and a maximum speed of 10 mls. The pause time is uniformly distributed between 0 and 20 ms. The simulation runs for 900ms. The transmission range of a node is set to 250 meters. Table I shows the parameters which have to be specified for the CASHnet scheme. We give each node the same starting amount of 100 Traffic Credits, 500 Real Money units and no Helper Credits. The exchange rate for Traffic/Helper Credits is set to I: 1. When a threshold of 10 Helper Credits is reached, a node can exchange its Helper Credits. The distance required between a node and a service station to conduct an exchange of credits is set to 50 meters.
We vary the number and the distribution of deployed service stations (1, 2, 9 and 12 as shown in Fig. 2 as well as 9 and 12 service stations distributed randomly) as well as the packet interval at the CBR traffi c sources (1 s, 5 s and 10 s). For each of the 18 simulation scenarios, 20 simulation runs have Fig. 3 . Starvation periods for all nodes during a single simulation run for scenario A and D been conducted. We measured the frequency of occurrence of starving events and the duration of the starvation.
C. Results
Figure 3 displays each node's starvation period(s) during a single simulation run for scenario A and D. Fig. 4-7 contain the results for the simulation scenarios A (1 service station), B (2 service stations), C (9 service stations) and D (12 service stations) for three packet intervals (10 s -top row, 5 s -middle row and 1 s bottom row). Fig. 8 and 9 contains the results for two scenarios with 9 and 12 randomly distributed service stations respectively.
Each histogram categorizes starvation events according to their duration. The boxes display the mean values of the num ber of starvations for the 20 simulation runs. The longer the starvation period (x axis), the smaller the number of starvations should be (y axis). A high amount of long starvations is naturally much worse than many small starvations.
From the figures several conclusions can be drawn. In Fig. 3 ,.
n.8nnrwllon�._ -===: :l f- is very obvious. In the first, many nodes starve for the whole simulation period in the latter only few nodes starve and even fewer for a long time. The figures also show that it is difficult to achieve an equilibrium between generating and forwarding packets so that no starvation occurs. This emphasizes the need for separating the right for transmission from the amount of forwarded packets.
Increasing the number of service stations reduces the overall number of starvations and transforms long starvations into short ones (compare Fig. 4 with Fig. 7 ). This can be explained easily by the increased probability that a node can refill • LJ�-L�LJ�-L��=L������ .� �m���m�����m_@���_�
SblI'VII ��(1) Fig. 6 . Mean number of starvations per duration category for scenario C randomly is not as effective as placing them in a aligned pattern (compare Fig. 7 with Fig. 9 ). Compared to the scenario D, the scenario with 12 randomly distributed service stations has a higher number of longer starvation periods. Thus an equal distribution of service stations increases their helpful effect on the overall network liveliness.
V. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We proposed a highly decentralized accounting and security architecture which provides a solid foundation for a cooper ation scheme based on rewards and which is applicable to multi-hop cellular networks. In contrast to previous work we allow selfi sh nodes, but encourage them to participate in packet forwarding via rewards. Additionally, we allow initiator as well as receiver based payment which -to the best of our knowledge -is not possible in the available schemes. Last, we do not charge nor reward for traffi c within the same multi- ,. 
